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Mediation as the Key to the
Successful Transfer of the Case of
Jean-Bosco Uwinkindi from the
Jurisdiction of the ICTR to the
Republic of Rwanda
Taylor Friedlander*
INTRODUCTION
The leaves of banana trees make a distinct sound when they are stirred
by the wind. It is almost like a whisper. Just outside the capital city of
Rwanda, there is a place so quiet that silence is often the only sound you
hear. This place is the Kayenzi Church.1 It once was a place of worship, but
today it serves as a memorial site to commemorate victims of the Rwandan
genocide.2 If you were to visit the site and step down into the basement,
there would be the creaking of stairs sighing beneath your weight, and a
gasp might escape your lips if it does not get caught in your throat. The
sight that meets your eyes will be an expanse of bones, piled in stacks that
touch the ceiling. These bones are laid to rest in memory of the 2,000

* Taylor Friedlander received her Juris Doctor from Pepperdine University School of Law in 2013.
1. The Kayenzi Church is located in the sector of Nyamata, outside Rwanda’s capital city,
Kigali. Prosecutor v. Uwinkindi, Case No. ICTR-2001-75-I, Indictment, ¶ 2 (Sept. 11, 2001),
available at http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/English/Uwinkindi/indictment/uwinkindi.pdf.
2. Nyamata Memorial Site, KIGALI MEMORIAL CENTRE, http://www.kigalimemorialcentre
.org/old/centre/other/nymata.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2012).
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victims whose lives were lost at and around the church,3 merely a fraction of
the estimated 500,000 to 1 million people killed.4
There was not one person, but many who carried out the murders that
took place at the Kayenzi Church during the Rwanda genocide. The first
section that follows will provide the historical background of Rwanda
genocide and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), which
would subsequently be created to try the most high-profile suspects involved
in perpetrating the genocide. The second section will focus on one suspect
in particular, Jean Bosco Uwinkindi, providing background on his case. The
third section will explain how four different systems of justice should be
involved in prosecuting Uwinkindi in order to fulfill the objectives of justice
held by both Rwanda and the international community. The fourth section
will focus on the reason why Uwinkindi’s case is important to Rwandan
jurisprudence, as it is the first case in history to be transferred from the ICTR
to the jurisdiction of the National Judiciary of Rwanda. This section also
will analyze the reasons why the ICTR decided to transfer the case, and will
suggest that mediation should be used to make the execution of the transfer
process as smooth as possible. The fifth and final section will provide a
brief conclusion, emphasizing the hopeful outlook for the relationship
between the ICTR and National Judiciary of Rwanda, especially if mediation
techniques are utilized in the future.
I.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE RWANDA GENOCIDE AND THE ICTR

A. Historical Background of the Rwanda Genocide
The Rwanda Genocide may have been carried out in 1994, but the seeds
of hatred that led to the atrocities were sown long before. Two ethnic
groups, the Tutsis and the Hutus, lived in Rwanda together for centuries, but

3. According to the International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda’s (ICTR) indictment of
Uwinkindi, 2,000 corpses were found at or near the Kayenzi Church. Uwinkindi, Case No. ICTR2001-75-I, Indictment, ¶ 25. However, according to the Kigali Memorial Center, 2,500 people were
killed at or near the church. Nyamata Memorial Site, supra note 2. The disjunction between these
estimates is due to the fact that investigations of the genocide sites were often conducted by
untrained observers. ALISON DES FORGES, LEAVE NONE TO TELL THE STORY 16 (Human Rights
Watch, 1999).
4. PHIL CLARK, THE GACACA COURTS, POST GENOCIDE JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION IN
RWANDA: JUSTICE WITHOUT LAWYERS 1 (Cambridge University Press, 2010). It is difficult for
researchers to gauge accurately the number of people killed during the genocide due to lack of
census data prior to 1994 and the fact that death tolls are “usually informed more by emotion than
fact.” DES FORGES, supra note 3, at 15–16. However, even with conservative estimates as to the
number of Tutsis killed, it is believed that at least 500,000 lost their lives. Id.
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not as equals.5 Around 1000 AD, the Hutu people arrived in Rwanda and
inhabited the land,6 but were dominated by the Tutsi’s militaristic conquest
in 1500 AD.7 Rwandan society settled into a clearly defined hierarchy
polarized between “Hutus,” the subordinates, and “Tutsis,” the minority
class of people who ruled over their many subjects.8 However, these
identities were not set in stone: a Tutsi could become a Hutu by losing
prestige, while a Hutu could become a Tutsi by acquiring wealth.9 During
this domination, Hutus were brewing resentments against the Tutsis, but it
was not until Belgium colonized Rwanda that those sentiments reached a
boil.10
Belgium gained colonial control of Rwanda in 1919 and instituted
policies that deepened the divide between the majority Hutus and minority
Tutsis.11 The most notable policy was the issuance of ethnic identity cards
in 1933.12 Whereas before, identification as a Tutsi or Hutu could change
with life circumstances, such identification was now permanently etched
into government documents.13 For years, Belgium encouraged the belief
amongst Rwandans that Tutsis were the superior minority class.14 However,
after World War II, Rwanda was placed under a United Nations trusteeship,

5. CLARK, supra note 4, at 16.
6. Id. at 15. Prior to the arrival of the Hutus, the Twa, a people of hunter-gatherers, had
inhabited Rwanda. Id. Today, the Twa make up approximately one percent of the Rwandan
population. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 16.
9. Id.
10. See id. at 16–17. While Belgium has left the longest lasting colonial impact on Rwanda,
Germany was the first country to colonize Rwanda. Id. at 16. In 1894, German colonists arrived at
Rwanda and began to forge an alliance with the Tutsis, the apparent and actual leaders. Id. Belgium
then gained control of Rwanda under a League of Nations mandate in 1919 and continued to foster a
relationship with the Tutsi leaders. Id.
11. Id. at 16. In addition to issuing of ethnic identity cards, Belgium also required the Hutus to
participate in forced labor for government projects, under the supervision of the Tutsis. Id. at 16–17
12. Id. at 16.
13. Id. at 16–17. Prior to Belgium’s colonial rule, status as a Hutu or Tutsi was fluid. One
factor used to determine whether a person was a Hutu or a Tutsi was the number of cows owned: a
person with ten or more head of cattle was deemed a Tutsi, and with any fewer, was categorized as a
Hutu. Id. at 17. By this standard, two people related by blood could be classified as belonging to
different races based on their prosperity levels. As a result, it was not uncommon that family
members turned on their own kinsmen during the genocide when Hutus were pitted against Tutsis.
Apocalypse, KIGALI MEMORIAL CENTRE, http://www.kigalimemorialcentre.org/old/genocide/rwanda
/thegenocide.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2012).
14. See id. at 16–17.
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designed to lead Rwanda to independence.15 With Rwanda’s autonomy on
the horizon, Belgium reevaluated its alliance with the Tutsis, realizing that
once Rwanda became self-governing, the Hutu majority would most likely
seize control.16 As a result, Belgium shifted its alliance to the Hutu majority,
aiding them in their transition to power.17
In 1959, the Parti du Mouvement de l’Emancipation des Bahutu
(PARMEHUTU), a Hutu political party, came into power with the support
of Belgium,18 and exiled over 700,000 Tutsis from Rwanda between 1959
and 1973.19 The PARMEHUTU also incited mass killings of more than
100,000 Tutsis by characterizing them as Hutu oppressors.20 Not wanting to
be seen as subversive, many Rwandans were afraid to speak out against the
totalitarian governance of the PARMEHUTU, thereby fostering a culture of
impunity.21 Tutsis were treated as second-class citizens,22 a legacy that
President Juvenal Habyarimana continued once he came into power in
1973.23 Habyarimana proclaimed that the number of civil service jobs and
school placements should reflect the ethnic makeup of the country.24 This
policy greatly reduced the opportunities for Tutsis to find placements in
universities and well-paid jobs.25

15. Id. at 17.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 18.
19. Path to a “Final Solution”, KIGALI MEMORIAL CENTRE, http://www.kigalimemorialcentre
.org/old/genocide/rwanda/political.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2012).
20. See IMMACULÉE ILIBAGIZA, LEFT TO TELL: DISCOVERING GOD AMIDST THE RWANDAN
HOLOCAUST 15 (Hay House, Inc., 2006). See also CLARK, supra note 4, at 18.
21. Id.
22. See ILIBAGIZA, supra note 20, at 15.
23. See id. at 18.
24. Id. The ethnic composition of Rwanda prior to the genocide was 85% Hutu, 14% Tutsi,
and 1%Twa. Id. The Twa are a minority tribe in Rwanda. See infra note 6.
25. ILIBAGIZA, supra note 20, at 18. Immaculée Ilibagiza, a survivor of the Rwandan
genocide, was denied a scholarship to fund her secondary education based on her racial background,
despite being ranked as one of the top two students in a class of sixty. Id. at 17–18.
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While the Tutsis suffered within Rwanda, the Tutsi diaspora that lived
beyond the borders shared a similar plight.26 As refugees, they were denied
basic rights to which their neighbors were entitled.27 If a revolution may be
justified by the oppression of a minority, then the deprivation that the Tutsis
suffered both in Rwanda and beyond its borders would be sufficient to spur
an uprising. On October 1, 1990, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), a
group of Tutsi diaspora living in Uganda, invaded Rwanda with the intent of
reclaiming the homeland they had been expelled from.28 A civil war
erupted, and in the midst of peace negotiations, then President Juvenal
Habyarimana was killed when his plane was shot down on April 6, 1994.29
The President’s death triggered the genocide that followed.30 Although the
United Nations had a presence in Rwanda, with the UN Assistance Mission
for Rwanda (UNAMIR) stationed in the country, it failed to act.31 Over the
next three months, Rwanda descended into genocidal violence until the RPF
won the civil war and declared victory on July 18, 1994, thereby ending the

26. See STEPHEN KINZER, A THOUSAND HILLS: RWANDA’S REBIRTH AND THE MAN WHO
DREAMED IT 35 (John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2008). Rwandan refugees in Uganda were forced to live
in remote refugee camps, where they were provided rations by a relief truck every one to two weeks.
Id. at 12. After a year, many refugees found themselves uprooted, without explanation, and forced
to resettle in a new location. Id.
27. See id. at 35.
28. CLARK, supra note 4, at 12–13; The RPF Invasion, KIGALI MEMORIAL CENTRE, http://
www.kigalimemorialcentre.org/old/genocide/rwanda/invasion.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2011).
29. KINZER, Supra note 26, at 137–39. The party responsible for President Habyarimana’s
death was never determined, although some theories implicate the RPF’s involvement. Id. at 139.
30. CLARK, supra note 4, at 14. President Habyarimana’s death did not cause a spontaneous
outburst of violence, but rather, was the triggering event for a premeditated plan of violence against
the Tutsis to be carried out. Id.
31. DES FORGES, supra note 3, at 595–99. An informant, codenamed “Jean-Pierre,” reported
to the Force Commander of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) (then
stationed in the country) that 1,700 soldiers were being trained in the Rwandan army for the purpose
of exterminating the Tutsis. Although the Force Commander of UNAMIR, Romeo Dallaire, wrote a
code cable on January 11, 1994 to the UN headquarters in New York, it failed to respond. FRED
GRUNFELD & ANKE HUIJBOOM, THE FAILURE TO PREVENT GENOCIDE IN RWANDA: THE ROLE OF
BYSTANDERS 95–97 (Martinus Nijhoff 2007).
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genocide.32 Following the ceasefire, thousands of Tutsi exiles returned to
their home country33 and the rule of Rwanda fell to a new regime that sought
to represent both the Tutsis and Hutus without bias towards any one group.34
After centuries of being ruled by a government dominated by either the
Hutus or the Tutsis, Rwanda had a government that, for the first time,

refused to align itself with a racial identity. The graphic below indicates the
rise and fall of Tutsi and Hutu regimes preceding the RPF’s new form of
leadership.

32. KINZER, supra note 26, at 177. Although the RPF victory put an end to the genocidal
violence to be carried out by the PARMEHUTU, the RPF also committed atrocities and were
accused of carrying out massacres and executions against civilians. The lack of prosecution against
the RPF is beyond the scope of this article. DES FORGES, supra note 3, at 16.
33. Id. at 311. Many of the Tutsi exiles returning to Rwanda had left as children or were born
outside Rwanda and had never before stepped foot in their homeland. Id.
34. KINZER, supra note 26, at 186. After the RPF declared victory, it established a
government with both Hutu and Tutsi leaders in order to gain popular support, especially from Hutu
Rwandans. Id. Although the RPF consisted primarily of Tutsis, there were also several members of
Hutu descent. Id. The RPF selected one of its most prominent Hutu members as the new president
as a strategic move to gain support for the new regime. Id. Today, Rwanda’s government strongly
discourages people from making any reference to race, and the very words “Hutu” and “Tutsi” have
become taboo. See Richard Grant, Paul Kagame: Rwanda’s Redeemer of Ruthless Dictator?, THE
TELEGRAPH (July 22, 2010, 9:00 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews
/africaandindianocean/rwanda/7900680/Paul-Kagame-Rwandas-redeemer-or-ruthless-dictator.html.
The current president, Paul Kagame, declared that the people of his country should no longer be
divided by race, as they “are all Rwandans now.” Id.
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This new leadership was optimistic, but it would have to lead a war-torn
nation faced with the challenge of prosecuting 100,000 cases of people
accused of genocide.35
B. Historical Background of the ICTR
i.

History of the ICTR

In the wake of the genocide, not one of Rwanda’s courts remained
standing, and of the approximately 800 lawyers and judges in Rwanda
before the genocide, only 40 were still alive.36 The genocide had destroyed
the national judiciary. The United Nations therefore saw not only a practical
need for establishing a criminal tribunal to try the cases of genocide,37 but a
symbolic one as well. Given that genocidaires were accused of committing
crimes against humanity that violated international law, their cases were of
international stature and merited trial by an international tribunal.38 In
response to this need, the United Nations Security Council passed
Resolution 955 to create the ICTR, with one of its major goals being to
“[send] a strong message to Africa’s leaders and warlords” against the
impunity that lead to Rwanda’s genocide, and to thereby “[provide] an
example to be followed in other parts of the world where these kinds of
crimes have also been committed.”39 Thus, the ICTR was focused not only
on justice at a national level within Rwanda, but also at an international
level.

35. Post Genocide Justice, KIGALI MEMORIAL CENTRE, http://www.kigalimemorialcentre.org
/old/genocide/rwanda/justice.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2012).
36. Jesse Melman, The Possibility Of Transfer(?): A Comprehensive Approach to the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda’s Rule 11bis to Permit Transfer to Rwandan Domestic
Courts, 49 FORDHAM L. REV. 1271, 1277 (2010).
37. Special Rapporteur for Rwanda of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights,
Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Rwanda, ¶¶ 79, 81, S/1994/1157 (Nov. 14, 1994) (by
René Degni-Ségui) (describing Rwanda’s need for international assistance with judicial and law
enforcement personnel, as well as the need for an International Court and local courts “to try persons
responsible for genocide, in order to stop, or at least reduce, acts of reprisal”).
38. S.C. Res. 955, preamble, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994) (“[T]he establishment of an
international tribunal for the prosecution of persons responsible for genocide and the other abovementioned violations of international humanitarian law will contribute to ensuring that such
violations are halted and effectively redressed . . . .”).
39. General Information, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA, http://www
.unictr.org/AboutICTR/GeneralInformation/tabid/101/Default.aspx (last visited Feb. 20, 2012).
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As the Security Council prepared for the creation of the ICTR, Rwanda
advocated that the tribunal should be located in Rwanda.40 However, in the
wake of the genocide, the Security Council feared that Rwanda would not be
secure enough to support an international tribunal, and therefore, placed the
ICTR in Arusha, Tanzania, despite protests by Rwandan officials.41
Consequently, the decision to locate the ICTR in a different country came at
the cost of distancing Rwandans from the justice being carried out on behalf
of the crimes suffered in their country.42
Although under Resolution 955, the ICTR and the National Judiciary of
Rwanda have concurrent jurisdiction over crimes of genocide, the ICTR has
primacy, meaning that it can compel Rwanda or any other jurisdiction to
transfer a case to its own jurisdiction.43 As a result, the ICTR has the
authority to try the cases of the most serious offenders, while most of the
victims are unable to attend the hearings or even learn about the process.
The net effect is that the victims are left to feel as though the justice process
does not address their interests. In fact, it was not until 1998 that Rwanda’s
radio system was able to establish a service to inform Rwandans about the
progress of the trials.44
Rwanda was not alone in resisting a policy that gave international courts
superior jurisdiction over that of national courts. National governments
frequently want to prosecute the perpetrators who carried out atrocities
within their countries and are often reluctant to relinquish jurisdiction over
such crimes to international tribunals.45 It follows naturally then that the
ICTR’s policy of primacy undermined the autonomy of Rwanda’s national
judiciary in its ability to hear cases of Rwandan genocidaires.
The national courts of Rwanda may only hear a case that the ICTR has
asserted jurisdiction over if that case has been formally transferred from the
ICTR to the National Judiciary of Rwanda. In order for this transfer to take
place, the National Judiciary of Rwanda must comply with the stipulations
set out in the ICTR Rules of Evidence and Procedure under Rule 11bis.46

40. Melman, supra note 36, at 1279 (citing U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/PV.3453 (Nov. 8, 1994)).
41. Melman, supra note 36, at 1279.
42. DES FORGES, supra note 3, at 746.
43. S.C. Res. 955, Article 28(2)(e), U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994) (declaring that states
shall comply with requests made by the Trial Chamber of the ICTR with requests for “[t]he
surrender or the transfer of the accused to the International Tribunal for Rwanda”).
44. DES FORGES, supra note 3, at 742.
45. Stephanos Bibas & William W. Burke-White, International Idealism Meets DomesticCriminal-Procedure Realism, 59 DUKE L.J. 637, 646 (2010).
46. Rules of Procedure and Evidence for the International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda, Rule
11bis (June 29, 1995).
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Thus, a motion to transfer a case from the ICTR to the National Judiciary of
Rwanda will hereinafter be referred to as an “11bis motion.” The ICTR
granted the first 11bis motion on June 28, 2011 for the case of Jean Bosco
Uwinkindi, which is discussed more thoroughly in the second and third
sections of this article.
ii. Effects of the ICTR: Successes and Shortcomings
Over the course of the fifteen years that the ICTR has been actively
trying genocidaires, it has completed a total of thirty-eight cases.47 While
this number may seem miniscule when compared to the thousands of cases
prosecuted by the National Judiciary of Rwanda,48 it is important to note that
domestic courts and international courts have fundamentally different
objectives. Domestic courts handle a broad spectrum of cases—from the
trivial to the most serious—and therefore have an exponentially larger
caseload. As a result, they must balance priorities of efficiency and justice.
Conversely, international courts adjudicate a narrowly selected caseload of
high profile crimes, and consequently, are in a position to prioritize justice
over efficiency.49
A major policy consideration driving international justice is the idea that
adjudicating high profile crimes may impact the global community in such a
manner as to deter future atrocities.50 The ICTR embodies this ideology, and
charges itself with the duty to pass on the lessons learned from the Rwanda
genocide in order to prevent a repetition of such crimes that may be
committed in other parts of the world.51 Therefore, the ICTR is not only
attempting to bring justice to Rwanda for the crimes that taint its past, but
47. Completed
Cases,
INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL
TRIBUNAL
OF
RWANDA,
http://unictr.org/Cases/tabid/77/Default.aspx?id=4&mnid=4 (last visited Feb. 20, 2012).
48. Post Genocide Justice, KIGALI MEMORIAL CENTRE, http://www.kigalimemorialcentre.org
/old/genocide/rwanda/justice.html.
49. Bibas & Burke-White, supra note 45, at 651–52 (“[I]nternational law targets a few highlevel, highly public, politically salient mass atrocities, which often arise out of political instability.”).
50. See Bibas & Burke-White, supra note 45, at 651–52 (“[I]nternational criminal justice,
which can use a few cases to send messages, is better than domestic criminal justice at the more
symbolic functions of punishing, vindicating victims, teaching, healing, and reconciling.”).
51. General Information, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA, http://www
.unictr.org/AboutICTR/GeneralInformation/tabid/101/Default.aspx (last visited Feb. 20, 2012). The
ICTR has made landmark decisions that shape international criminal justice today: it applied the
United Nations 1948 Convention Against Genocide for the first time in history. Adama Dieng,
Capacity-Building Efforts of the ICTR: A Different Kind of Legacy, 9 NW. U. J. INT’L HUM. RTS.
403, 404 (2011).
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also is hoping to create a deterrent effect that will be of worldwide benefit in
the future.
Supporters of the ICTR believe that its activities have had the desired
deterrent effect. Since its inception, fifteen countries have turned over
discovered genocidaires within their borders to the ICTR, which the ICTR
believes has resulted in “a progressive realization in these countries that they
cannot allow fugitives from international justice in their domain.”52 While
the ICTR claims to have benefitted the international community, whether
Rwanda has benefitted as a nation is another issue altogether.
The ICTR’s proceedings had the unintended effect of undermining a
sense of justice among Rwandans at national and local levels. Criminals
prosecuted by the tribunal, charged with the most severe crimes in
international criminal jurisprudence, usually enjoy a better quality of life in
the ICTR’s prison facilities than individuals accused of lesser crimes and
held in Rwandan courts. The ICTR itself reports that prisoners receive
“meals that are prepared under the supervision of a qualified dietician and
medical officer,” as well as “periods of common activity such as religious
observance, educational classes or physical exercise.”53
Meanwhile, genocidaires tried in Rwanda were often underfed, only had
access to dirty drinking water, and lived in cells where they were often
compelled to sleep in latticework formations because of the lack of space.54
Although Rwanda’s prison conditions have improved drastically in recent
years, during the years immediately following the genocide, the conditions
were dismal.55 While international and regional agreements advocate for
living conditions that allow prisoners to maintain their health and dignity,56

52. General Information, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA, http://www
.unictr.org/AboutICTR/GeneralInformation/tabid/101/Default.aspx (last visited Feb. 20, 2012).
53. Detention of Suspects and Convicted Persons, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR
RWANDA, http://www.unictr.org/AboutICTR/FactSheets/DetentionofSuspectsandConvictedPersons
/tabid/114/Default.aspx (last visited Feb. 20, 2012).
54. CLARK, supra note 4, at 50.
55. CLARK, supra note 4, at 99. While Rwanda’s prison conditions were some of the worst in
the world in the years immediately following the genocide, those conditions have improved
dramatically as a result of aid provided by the Red Cross and the Dutch government. Id. Such
assistance has enabled Rwanda to construct additional prison facilities. Id. While in the year 2000,
there were approximately 120,000 prisoners held in overcrowded penitentiaries, this number
decreased as genocidaires completed their prison sentences, easing the overcrowding, and thereby
improving living conditions. Mpanga, a Stronghold for the UN in Rwanda, INTERNATIONAL
JUSTICE TRIBUNE (May 4, 2008, 11:00 PM) http://www.rnw.nl/international-justice/article/mpangastronghold-un-rwanda. As of 2008, approximately 58,000 prisoners were being held in facilities
throughout Rwanda. Id.
56. African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Ouagadougou Declaration and Plan
of Action on Accelerating Prisons and Penal Reforms in Africa, ¶ 4, Sept. 22, 2002,
http://www.achpr.org/english/declarations/declaration_ouagadougou_en.html.

462

https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol13/iss3/3

10

Friedlander: Mediation as the Key to the Successful Transfer of the Case of Je

[Vol. 13:453, 2013]
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL

Rwanda’s lack of resources in the wake of the genocide made compliance
with such standards unattainable. As a result, there was a stark contrast
between the ideal living conditions for prisoners provided by the ICTR to
individuals accused of the worst crimes, versus the conditions experienced
by those accused of lesser crimes and held in Rwanda’s penitentiaries. The
high quality of life provided to suspects being prosecuted by the ICTR when
compared to the quality of life experienced by Rwandan prisoners—or even
by Rwandans living freely but in poverty—made many question whether the
ICTR was truly delivering justice.
When the Security Council called for the establishment of the ICTR, its
placement in Tanzania instead of Rwanda was based on the belief that a
court could derive integrity from its geography. At the time, the Security
Council and United Nations believed that establishing the Tribunal in
Tanzania, which was more secure than Rwanda, would better facilitate the
deliverance of justice.57 However, as international criminal justice evolved,
it became clear that international justice could leave behind a more powerful
legacy when the court delivering justice is embedded in the community
where the crimes occurred.58 For this reason, the United Nations Special
Court for Sierra Leone, another site of international criminal trials, is located
within its own boundaries, despite the fact that Sierra Leone was scarcely
more secure than Rwanda following the genocide.59 While the family and
friends of victims of the Sierra Leone tragedy are able to benefit from an
international court in-country, the family and friends of the victims of the
Rwanda genocide have experienced a strained relationship with the ICTR.
The ICTR’s location in Arsuha, Tanzania limits the positive effects that
Rwanda can garner from the Tribunal. This distance of the Tribunal from
the country where the genocide took place prevents the healing effects of
justice from being fully experienced in Rwanda, as the developments of the
cases are not readily accessible to Rwandans. While a local paper in
Tanzania, THE ARUSHA TIMES, dedicates a page to Tribunal developments,60
57. Interview with Martin Ngoga, Prosecutor General of Rwanda, Umubano Hotel in Kigali,
Rwanda (July 7, 2011).
58. Id. International courts that are located in-country (also termed “international domestic
courts” or “semi-internationalized courts”) are “proximate to the events in question, have the best
access to relevant evidence, and may be able to play a positive role in the local processes of
reconciliation.” Therefore, courts that are located in country have the ability to provide a significant
impact on international criminal justice. William W. Burke-White, A Community of Courts: Toward
A System of International Criminal Law Enforcement, 24 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1, 24 (2002).
59. Interview with Martin Ngoga, supra note 57.
60. Dieng, supra note 51, at 407–08.
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Rwandan knowledge of the proceedings is limited by whether Rwandan
journalists are able to report on them. As a result, by the time that the results
of a case reach Rwandans, it is not uncommon for Rwandans to feel that
they were not part of the justice process.61 This sentiment often intensifies
when Rwandans learn of the ICTR’s decisions to acquit suspects. In
October 2011, members of Ibuka, one of Rwanda’s largest support
organizations for genocide survivors,62 expressed outrage when the ICTR
acquitted Casmir Bizimungu and Jerome Bicamumpaka, two government
ministers suspected of committing genocide.63 Ibuka’s frustration likely
stems from the attenuated relationship between the ICTR and the Rwandan
community as a result of its contentious history and geographic distance.
Additionally, the distance of the ICTR’s location in Tanzania from
Rwandan lawyers and advocates has made it more difficult for those
individuals to argue that the allocation of resources be divided equally
between the ICTR and the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia
(ICTY). The ICTY was created at the same time as the ICTR, and the two
tribunals share the same resources, including personnel.64 Between the 1999
and 2003, which proved to be one of the most turbulent times in the
relationship between Rwanda and the ICTR, Carla del Ponte served as the
Prosecutor General for both the ICTR and the ICTY.65 Del Ponte spent the
vast majority of her time working on ICTY matters in the Hague, and as a
result, Rwandan advocates felt that justice was not being carried out on their
behalf; 66 in fact, Rwanda called for her resignation several times.67 In 2003,
Hassan Bubacar Jallow, a Gambian lawyer, was assigned the post of
Prosecutor General and charged with responsibility for the ICTR only, and
not the ICTY.68 This appointment acknowledged Rwanda’s need for a
Prosecutor General who would dedicate sufficient time and effort only to
Rwanda’s genocide cases, thereby contributing to an ease in tensions
between the ICTR and Rwanda. The relationship between Rwanda and the
ICTR will likely continue to improve as the ICTR takes more actions that
61. DES FORGES, supra note 3, at 742.
62. IBUKA, http://www.ibuka.rw (last visited Feb. 20, 2012).
63. James Karuhanga, Ibuka Considers Protests Over ICTR Acquittals, NEW TIMES (Oct. 5,
2011), http://www.newtimes.co.rw/news/index.php?i=14769&a=45890.
64. Registrars of ICTR and ICTY Sign Statement of Cooperation, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
TRIBUNAL FOR YUGOSLAVIA (Sept. 21, 2001), http://www.icty.org/sid/7952.
65. See Interview with Carla del Ponte, HIRONDELLE NEWS (Sept. 16, 2003), http://www
.hirondellenews.com/content/view/692/26/.
66. Interview with Martin Ngoga, supra note 57.
67. Interview with Carla del Ponte, supra note 65.
68. Office of the Prosecution, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA,
http://www.unictr.org/AboutICTR/ICTRStructure/OfficeoftheProsecution/tabid/104/Default.aspx
(last visited Feb. 20, 2012).
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acknowledge Rwanda’s needs and expectations. For this reason, the ICTR’s
recent decision to transfer a case, for the first time in history, from the ICTR
to the National Judiciary of Rwanda may have pivotal effects in the
relationship between the ICTR and Rwanda. A discussion of this case and
the transfer decision follows.
II. THE CASE OF PASTOR JEAN BOSCO UWINKINDI
On June 28, 2011, the ICTR made a precedential decision to transfer the
case of Jean Bosco Uwinkindi from its jurisdiction to the National Judiciary
of Rwanda. Uwinkindi’s story is one defined by a series of transfers, the
first of which took place on a personal and spiritual level. During the
Rwanda genocide, some pastors had a greater desire to serve their political
interests then to serve their penitents. Jean Bosco Uwinkindi was one such
pastor, and so he transferred his priorities from being spiritual guide to
becoming a political player. As a radical member of the PARMEHUTU,
Uwinkindi is accused of advocating for the extermination of Tutsis, whom
he referred to as the inyenzi, 69 meaning “cockroaches” in Kinyarwanda, the
native language of Rwandans.70
Uwinkindi is accused of organizing a group of killers that lived at a
church and would lead Tutsis there to meet their deaths.71 The group, under
the leadership of Uwinkindi, is accused of a series of atrocities,72 such as
allowing Tutsi women and children to stay at the church under the guise of
refuge, only to have them murdered.73 Additionally, Uwinkindi is accused
of ordering his men to stop fleeing Tutsis at roadblocks and to execute
them,74 and for hunting Tutsis who were seeking refuge in swamps.75
In July 1994, when Uwinkindi fled Rwanda, the remains of
approximately 2,000 men, women and children were found at or near the

69. Prosecutor v. Uwinkindi, Case No. ICTR-2001-75-I, Indictment, ¶ 3 (Nov. 9, 2001), http://
unictr.org/Portals/0/Case%5CEnglish%5CUwinkindi%5Cindictment%5Cuwinkindi.pdf.
70. KINZER, supra note 67, at 34.
71. Uwinkindi, Case No. ICTR-2001-75-I, Indictment, ¶ 3. The church was known as the
Kayenzi church, located in the sector of Nyamata, a rural area outside Kigali. Id. ¶ 2. Uwinkindi
directed attackers in groups: one such group contained approximately one hundred people. Id. ¶ 4.
72. See id. ¶ 29–30.
73. Id. ¶ 11. The women and children were murdered brutally using traditional weapons such
as machetes. It is alleged that on one occasion, after a woman was killed by gunfire, Uwinkindi
ordered that traditional weapons be used instead in order to conserve their firearms. Id. ¶ 24.
74. Id. ¶ 8.
75. Id. ¶ 18, 21.
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church where he and his men conducted their operations.76 Today, the
church is a memorial, holding the clothing and bones of those that were
murdered.77 While the bones are kept underground in the basement of the
church, the garments are kept above ground and stacked in waist-high piles
on the pews. In one of these piles, there may be the clothing of Uwinkindi’s
wife and two children; they were Tutsis, and suffered the same fate as those
who shared their ethnic identity.78
III. THE PROSECUTION OF UWINKINDI AND THE FOUR JUSTICE SYSTEMS
INVOLVED
To adequately bring Uwinkindi to justice, he should be touched by four
justice systems. The first system that will be discussed is the ICTR, and the
second system to be discussed is gacaca, a traditional Rwanda justice
system that will be introduced and discussed in this section. The third
system of justice is mediation, which can be used to encourage
reconciliation between the perpetrators of genocide and the family and
friends of those victimized. Finally, the fourth system of justice that this
section addresses is the National Judiciary of Rwanda, which will handle
Uwinkindi’s case once it is officially transferred from the ICTR.
A. The ICTR: the First System of Justice Involved in Uwinkindi’s
Prosecution
In 2001, the ICTR indicted Uwinkindi for genocide,79 conspiracy to
commit genocide, and crimes against humanity.80 Uwinkindi evaded arrest
for nine years until he was discovered and arrested on June 30, 2010 in

76. Id. ¶ 25.
77. Nyamata Memorial Site, supra note 2.
78. Uwinkindi, Case No. ICTR-2001-75-I, Indictment, ¶ 25.
79. The definition of genocide used by the ICTR is “any of the following acts committed with
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a)
Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical
destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.” See Statute of the International
Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda (hereinafter ICTR statute), art. 2 (Nov. 4, 1994). This definition
reflects the definition given to genocide in Article 6 of the Rome Statute for the International
Criminal Court. Id.
80. Uwinkindi, Case No. ICTR-2001-75-I, Indictment.
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Uganda.81 On June 28, 2011, the first 11bis motion was granted in the
history of the ICTR to transfer Uwinkindi’s case from the ICTR to
Rwanda’s national courts.82 However, before this motion was granted,
another system of justice, known as gacaca, carried out proceedings to bring
Uwinkindi to justice.
B. Gacaca Courts: the Second System of Justice Involved in Uwinkindi’s
Prosecution
Gacaca is derived from a Kinyarwanda word meaning “the grass,” and
is a traditional justice system that developed in Rwanda.83 Case hearings
took place outdoors in full public view as a community-based forum of
dispute resolution.84 Professional lawyers are barred from participating, and
the judges, elected from the community, have minimal legal training.85
Rwanda’s decision to use gacaca to hear genocide cases was controversial.
Gacaca traditionally had been used to resolve disputes over offenses like
cattle rustling, and there were doubts as to whether a justice system typically
used for resolving relatively simple wrongs could be applied to complex
cases of genocide.86 Ultimately, the government’s decision to implement
gacaca was based on necessity. By 2000, only 2,500 cases had been heard
by the national court system, less than 3% of the total backlog.87 At this
rate, most accused genocidaires would have died by the time the court was
ready to hear their cases.88 In response, Rwanda passed legislation in 2001
to approve the use of gacaca courts for addressing crimes committed during

81. Uwinkindi, Case No. ICTR-2001-75-I, Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for Referral to
the Republic of Rwanda (Trial Chamber, June 28, 2011), http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case%5C
English%5CUwinkindi%5Cdecisions%5C110628.pdf.
82. See generally id.
83. CLARK, supra note 4, at 14. Although an ancient system of justice, gacaca is constantly
evolving to comport with the contemporary needs of Rwandan society. Prior to the Belgian colonial
era, gacaca was based on unwritten laws, but became more formalized under Belgium’s colonial
rule: evidence was collected, and judgments rendered based on the testimonies given. Id. at 52–54.
84. Id. at 1, 14, 52.
85. Id. at 3.
86. U.N. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, REPORT ON THE SITUATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN
RWANDA SUBMITTED BY THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE, MR. MICHEL MOUSSALLI, PURSUANT TO
RESOLUTION 1998/69, ¶ 51, E/CN.4/1999/33 (Feb. 8, 1999).
87. CLARK, supra note 4, at 56.
88. Id.
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the genocide.89 By 2010, gacaca tried its last cases. 90 In total, an estimated
one million cases were tried through gacaca.91
While the use of gacaca courts increased the rate at which cases were
tried, and greatly eased the backlog of cases, some human rights groups
argue that such gains in efficiency should not come at the cost of sacrificing
due process.92 Genocide suspects are denied the right to legal counsel in
gacaca proceedings, and some suspects, including Uwinkindi, have been
tried in absentia.93 Uwinkindi was tried in absentia by gacaca courts on two
occasions, though the gacaca Appeals Chamber later vacated these
decisions.94
Although gacaca’s judgment of Uwinkindi was later rendered void, the
process of reaching that judgment helped to foster reconciliation in the
Rwandan community by allowing family and friends of the victims to
communicate the events they witnessed.95 In gacaca, the process of
uncovering the truth may be as important as the truth itself.96 Speaking in
general terms, there are three separate processes undertaken in uncovering
the truth after a conflict: “truth-telling,” “truth-hearing,” and “truthshaping.”97 Truth telling is the public articulation of the truth, usually
comprised of testimony by witnesses. 98 During Uwinkindi’s gacaca
hearings, witnesses to his crimes likely had the opportunity to testify as to
what they saw, and as a result, experience a sense of catharsis through that
process. Truth-hearing is the process by which the person listening to the

89. Id. at 3. In 2001, more than 250,000 gacaca judges were elected to hear the overload of
genocide cases. Id.
90. Id. at 6.
91. Id. at 51, fn. 8. While about one million cases have been tried by gacaca, there is debate as
to the exact number of suspects that have been tried, as a single suspect may be accused of multiple
crimes, thereby meriting multiple cases. Id.
92. Id. at 174. Human Rights Watch (HRW), was one of the more vocal groups that
advocated against gacaca due to its lack of due process rights for suspects. Id. at 34.
93. Id. at 160. Due to the diffuse nature of the gacaca courts, the central government of
Rwanda is often uniformed of developments within gacaca. As a result, suspects have been tried in
absentia, even on occasions in which the central government would have otherwise intervened to
prevent such hearings from taking place.
94. Uwinkindi, Case No. ICTR-2001-75-I, Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for Referral to
the Republic of Rwanda at 12, ¶31, fn. 43. Uwinkindi was convicted by a gacaca court on two
occasions: in May 2009 in the sector of Kayumba, and in August 2009 in the sector of Ntarama. Id.
However, the appeals chamber court of gacaca vacated both decisions, holding that it violated the
Rwanda Transfer Law. Id.
95. See CLARK, supra note 4, at 63.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 34.
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truth-teller receives the content.99 For friends and families of victims who
have yet to learn how certain victims died, the process of truth-hearing has a
healing effect.100 Family and friends of Uwinkindi’s victims would have
experienced a sense of closure by listening to the witnesses share their
experiences. Finally, truth-shaping is the process by which parties external
to the truth-telling, such as historians, journalists, and the public at large,
receive information and interpret it.101 To gacaca judges, truth-shaping is
important to the extent that it teaches moral lessons to Rwandans and makes
clear a policy of punishing those guilty of crimes.102
Gacaca, unlike the ICTR, brings justice to genocidaires using
alternative dispute resolution techniques that have proven to be effective in
reconciling the family and friends of victims with the perpetrators
responsible for the deaths of their loved ones. Gacaca judges serve distinct
roles as mediators by helping the family and friends of victims to
communicate with the accused perpetrators, who in turn, may voice
apologies or recount events.103 This type of exchange between victims and
perpetrators is absent from ICTR proceedings. While gacaca judges are
helpful in serving as mediators, professional mediators outside the gacaca
framework have also been helpful in fostering reconciliation in Rwanda.
C. Mediation of Apology and Forgiveness: the Third System of Justice that
Should Be Involved in Uwinkindi’s Prosecution
The concept of using mediation to foster apology and forgiveness, and
thereby instill a sense of justice, is elucidated in the documentary, As We
Forgive,104 which explores Rwanda’s process of reconciliation after the
genocide. As We Forgive portrays how a mediator, Pastor Guhegi, helped to
reconcile two Rwandans, identified by their first names: Rosaria and
Saveri.105 Saveri had killed Rosaria’s sister and her sister’s children during
the genocide.106 After Saveri served prison time as punishment for his

99. Id. at 34.
100. Id. at 34.
101. Id. at 192.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 168.
104. AS WE FORGIVE (Image Bearer Pictures 2008).
105. Id.
106. Id.
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crimes, he was released.107 The documentary portrays how a mediator,
Pastor Gahigi, helped Rosaria and Saveri reconcile and live together in the
same community.108 Rosaria was devastated by the loss that Saveri had
inflicted on her.109 They had been friends before the genocide, but when the
civil war commenced, Saveri turned on Rosaria and her family.110 Even
after Saveri had served his sentence, Rosaria still held resentment against
him for her suffering.111
Pastor Gahigi, acting as a mediator between Rosaria and Saveri, helped
to foster reconciliation between the two.112 Rosaria supported herself by
growing a cereal crop called sorghum.113 After harvesting her crop, Rosaria
had to carry out the process of separating the seeds from the harvested
plant.114 Alone, Rosaria would neither be able to process her harvest before
pests destroyed it, nor could she afford to hire workers to help her.115 Pastor
Gahigi suggested that Saveri, as a step towards reconciling with Rosaria,
offer to help her process her harvest.116 Rosaria accepted, and perhaps as a
result of Saveri’s labor contribution, she was eventually able to release some
of her resentment towards him.117 His act of volunteering both helped
Rosaria and allowed her to trust him more.118 The dynamic that arose as a
result of the Pastor Gahigi’s mediation is represented in Appendix 1, and is a
specific example of the more general dynamic of mediated apology,
forgiveness, and reconciliation.
Legal scholar Lee Taft describes apology as valuable because it “offers
the offender a vehicle for expressing repentance and the offended an
opportunity to forgive.”119 Unfortunately, the geographic distance between
Rwanda and the ICTR in Tanzania prevented any type of mediation between
the family and friends of the victims of the genocide and the genocidaires
charged by the ICTR. However, with Uwinkindi’s transfer to the
jurisdiction of the National Judiciary of Rwanda, there is more of a

107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. See id.
118. See id.
119. Lee Taft, Apology Subverted: The Commodification of Apology, 109 YALE L. J. 1135,
1138 (2000).
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possibility of interaction between him and the family and friends of victims.
Unlike Saveri, Uwinkindi most likely will not be in a position to perform
labor contributions for the loved ones of his victims, but he may be able to
make a verbal apology, should he feel such a sentiment. Taft emphasizes
that apology is essential for both the offender and the offended to heal and to
move forward,120 and so the ICTR and National Judiciary of Rwanda should
make efforts towards involving a mediator to encourage a verbal exchange
between Uwinkindi and the loved ones of his victims.
D. The National Judiciary of Rwanda: the Fourth System of Justice
Involved in Prosecuting Uwikindi
While a primary focus of the gacaca courts and mediators is fostering
reconciliation, the National Judiciary of Rwanda has a broader set of goals.
The national judiciary is concerned not only with reconciliation, but also
with how it is perceived by the international community and the Trial
Chambers of the ICTR. In order for the ICTR to transfer cases to national
courts, the ICTR Trial Chamber must be satisfied “that the accused will
receive a fair trial in the courts of the State concerned.”121 Aside from
Rwanda, the only country that the ICTR has transferred a case to is
France.122 In determining whether to allow a case to be transferred from the
ICTR to the court of another country, the ICTR holds Rwanda to a different
standard than that of European countries. While the adequacy of the
judiciaries in European countries is evaluated based on whether those
countries’ laws comply with ICTR standards, the adequacy of the Rwandan
judiciary is evaluated based not only on Rwanda’s laws, but also on how
Rwanda enforces those laws.123 The separate standard that Rwanda is held
to, compared to European countries, likely has also been a source of tension
between Rwanda and the ICTR.

120. Id. at 1138.
121. Rules of Procedure and Evidence for the International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda, Rule
11bis (June 29, 1995).
122. Two cases have been transferred to France’s jurisdiction. See Prosecutor v. Bucyibaruta,
Case No. ICTR-05-85, Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for Referral to France (Trial Chamber,
Nov. 20, 2007), http://unictr.org/Portals/0/Case%5CEnglish%5CBucyibaruta%5Cdecisions%5C071
120.pdf; Prosecutor v. Munyeshyaka, Case No. ICTR-05-87, Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for
Referral to France (Trial Chamber, Nov. 20, 2007), http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case%5C
English%5CMunyeshyaka%5Cdecisions%5C071120.pdf.
123. Melman, supra note 36, at 1298, 1302–03.
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Uwinkindi’s case is one of several that the National Judiciary of
Rwanda has been attempting to gain jurisdiction over for the past five years.
The climactic granting of the 11bis motion to transfer Uwinkindi’s case from
the ICTR to Rwanda indicates that the national judiciary, in the eyes of the
ICTR, is now competent to deliver justice.124 By the time Uwinkindi’s case
is heard, he will have been touched by three of the four systems that handle
post-genocide justice: the ICTR, the gacaca courts, and the national
judiciary. It has not been formally determined whether a form of mediation
to foster apology and forgiveness will be used in Uwinkindi’s case.
However, in addition to helping heal family and friends of victims in the
genocide, mediation in Uwinkindi’s case would also improve the
relationship between the ICTR and the National Judiciary of Rwanda. A
discussion of this relationship, in the context of the ICTR’s decision to grant
the 11bis motion in Uwinkindi’s case, follows.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE DECISION TO TRANSFER UWINKINDI’S CASE FROM
THE ICTR TO THE NATIONAL JUDICIARY OF RWANDA
Prior to granting the 11bis motion in Uwinkindi’s case, the ICTR had a
confirmed track record of denying requests to transfer cases to Rwanda. In
2008, the ICTR entertained and denied a number of 11bis motions, including
those made in the cases of Jean Baptise Gatete, Yussuf Munyakazi, Gaspard
Kanyarukiga, and Fulgence Kayishema.125 Although the ICTR praised

124. Uwinkindi’s case may also set precedent for other cases to be transferred from the ICTR
to the National Judiciary of Rwanda. The prosecutor of the ICTR has already requested the transfer
of three more accused genocidaires now that the case of Uwinkindi appears to have opened the door
for the granting of 11bis motions. James Karuhanga & Edmund Kagire, Rwanda: ICTR Refers
Another Genocide Suspect to Local Courts, ALL AFRICA (Feb. 24, 2012), http://allafrica.com/stories
/201202240184.html. The transfer decision in Uwinkindi’s case may even affect the decisions of
other countries in evaluating whether to extradite alleged genocidaires to Rwanda. In the past,
national courts deciding whether to extradite alleged genocidaires to Rwanda had based their
decisions on the precedent set by the ICTR’s denial of 11bis motions. Uwinkindi, Case No. ICTR2001-75-I, Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for Referral to the Republic of Rwanda, ¶ 42. Now
that the 11bis motion was granted in the case of Uwinkindi, foreign jurisdictions may begin
transferring cases to Rwanda.
125. See Prosecutor v. Gatete, Case No. ICTR-2000-61, Decision On Prosecutor’s Request for
Referral to the Republic of Rwanda (Trial Chamber, Nov. 17, 2008), http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0
/Case%5CEnglish%5CGatete%5Cdecisions%5C081117.pdf; Prosecutor v. Munyakazi, Case No.
ICTR-97-36, Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for Referral to the Republic of Rwanda (App.
Chambers, Oct. 8, 2008), http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case%5CEnglish%5CMunyakazi%5C
decisions%5C081008.pdf; Prosecutor v. Kanyarukiga Case No. ICTR-2002-78, Decision on
Prosecutor’s Request for Referral to the Republic of Rwanda (App. Chamber, Oct. 30, 2008), http://
www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case%5CEnglish%5CKanyarukiga%5Cdicisions%5C081030.pdf;
Prosecutor v. Kayishema Case No. ICTR-01-67, Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for Referral to
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Rwanda for aspects of its justice system that inspired confidence in its
ability to hear transfer cases—such as its impartiality, the ability to
guarantee adequate representation to defendants, and ensuring humane
treatment of the defendants—the ICTR nonetheless acknowledged what it
classified as flaws in the National Judiciary of Rwanda.126
The primary reasons that the ICTR cited for the denying the 11bis
motions were the risk that a defendant in a transfer case could be subject to
life imprisonment with solitary confinement and the lack of an adequate
witness protection program.127 The ICTR was not cooperative with the
National Judiciary of Rwanda in resolving the sentencing issue, but was
cooperative in helping Rwanda to create an adequate witness protection
program. Within this section, Part A will discuss the issue of sentencing,
while Part B will discuss the issue of Rwanda’s witness protection program,
as well as other areas that the ICTR and Rwanda have been able to cooperate
on in a positive way. Part C will then offer suggestions to help the ICTR
and National Judiciary of Rwanda better cooperate with each other in a
manner that embodies the spirit of the progress made on Rwanda’s witness
protection program.
A. Life Imprisonment with Solitary Confinement as a Possible Sentence in
a Transfer Case
Although Rwanda passed legislation in July 2007 to prevent the
imposition of the death penalty, under its Death Penalty Abolition Law,128
the ICTR was not convinced that this legislation would guard against the
possibility of defendants in transfer cases being subject to life imprisonment

the Republic of Rwanda (Trial Chamber, Dec. 16, 2008), http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case%5C
English%5Ckayishema%5Ctrail%20chamber%5C081216.pdf .
126. See Gatete, Case No. ICTR-2000-61, Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for Referral to the
Republic of Rwanda ¶¶ 28, 30, 60–64, 83; Munyakazi, Case No. ICTR-97-36, Decision on
Prosecutor’s Request for Referral to the Republic of Rwanda ¶¶ 20, 38, 40; Kanyarukiga, Case No.
ICTR-2002-78, Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for Referral to the Republic of Rwanda, ¶¶ 16, 27,
31.
127. See Gatete, Case No. ICTR-2000-61, Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for Referral to the
Republic of Rwanda, ¶¶ 60–64; see also Munyakazi, Case No. ICTR-97-36, Decision on
Prosecutor’s Request for Referral to the Republic of Rwanda, ¶¶ 20, 38, 40; Kanyarukiga, Case No.
ICTR-2002-78, Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for Referral to the Republic of Rwanda, ¶¶ 16, 27,
31.
128. Death Penalty Abolition Law, Organic Law No. 31/2007, art. 2 (Rwanda) (2007).
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with solitary confinement.129 Rwanda’s Death Penalty Abolition Law allows
for life imprisonment with special provisions.130 The ICTR argued that one
such special provision that could be allowed under this law is life
imprisonment with solitary confinement. Such a punishment would breach
Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), to which Rwanda is a party.131
While Rwanda’s legislation on transfer cases specifically bars life
imprisonment with solitary confinement, the ICTR nonetheless held that
Rwanda’s Death Penalty Abolition Law created an unacceptable level of
ambiguity.132 Therefore, a major reason why the ICTR refused to transfer a
case to Rwanda was the fear that it would impose a sentence of life
imprisonment with solitary confinement on a defendant.133 Even after
Rwanda eliminated this ambiguity by passing a law in 2008 that modified
the Death Penalty Law such that life imprisonment with “special provisions”
could not be applied to transfer cases, the ICTR was still not satisfied.134
The ICTR expressed the concern that Rwanda’s law, though on the books,
might not be properly enforced.135 As a result, the ICTR did not have
confidence that Rwanda would take sufficient safeguards against such a
sentence of life imprisonment with solitary confinement.136

129. See Gatete, Case No. ICTR-2000-61, Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for Referral to the
Republic of Rwanda, ¶¶ 60–64; see also Munyakazi, Case No. ICTR-97-36, Decision on
Prosecutor’s Request for Referral to the Republic of Rwanda, ¶¶ 20, 38, 40; Kanyarukiga, Case No.
ICTR-2002-78, Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for Referral to the Republic of Rwanda, ¶¶ 16, 27,
31.
130. Death Penalty Abolition Law, supra note 128.
131. See Mental Illness, Human Rights, and US Prisons, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, (2009)
http://www.hrw.org/news/2009/09/22/mental-illness-human-rights-and-us-prisons.
The Human
Rights Watch (HRW) has interpreted Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR), prohibiting torture and inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, to include
solitary confinement). Id. The international community as a whole affirms the HRW’s stance on
this point. See Uwinkindi, Case No. ICTR-2001-75-I, Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for Referral
to the Republic of Rwanda, ¶ 51.
132. See Gatete, Case No. ICTR-2000-61, Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for Referral to the
Republic of Rwanda, ¶ 9. Article 21 of Rwanda’s Transfer Law provides that “life imprisonment”
shall be the heaviest penalty, without any reference to imprisonment “with special provisions.”
Additionally, Article 9 of the Transfer Law states that “[a]ll legal provisions contrary to this Organic
Law are hereby repealed.” Despite the language of the Transfer Law, the Trial Chamber held that
given the potential ambiguity created by the conflicting laws, the possibility that life imprisonment
in solitary confinement might be applied as a punishment was grounds for denial of the Rule 11bis
motion. Id.
133. Id.
134. Kayishema Case No. ICTR-01-67 Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for Referral to the
Republic of Rwanda, ¶ 27.
135. Id.
136. Id. ¶ 14.
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The ICTR’s hardened refusal to grant an 11bis motion prior to the
Uwinkindi case raises questions as to the ICTR’s motivation. The ICTR’s
press releases focused on the United Nations’ progress in working towards
achieving international justice, rather than on Rwanda’s healing.137 In a
children’s book released by the ICTR designed to educate children about the
Rwanda genocide, the only mention of post-genocide justice is in reference
to the ICTR without any mention of the gacaca courts or of the National
Judiciary of Rwanda.138 Perhaps one of the reasons that the ICTR was
reluctant to transfer cases to Rwanda was to uphold the stature of the
mechanism charged with arresting the pivotal suspects bearing the greatest
responsibility in the genocide. It was only after key changes arose in the
United Nations Security Council’s stance towards the ICTR that the ICTR
became willing to loosen its grip on the most pivotal cases and allowed
Rwanda’s jurisdiction to have the chance of trying them.
On December 22, 2010, the Security Council passed Resolution 1966,
calling for the ICTR to expedite its completion strategy.139 The ICTR had
fallen behind in its timeline of activities. According to Security Council
Resolutions 1503 and 1534, passed in 2003 and 2004 respectively, the ICTR
was supposed to have completed all trial activities by 2008, and all work as a
whole in 2010.140 Security Council Resolution 1966 acknowledged that the
completion dates had not been met and envisaged December 31, 2014 as a
more realistic date for completion.141
Under Resolution 1966, the ICTR will be replaced with a Residual
Mechanism, to be instituted July 1, 2012.142 Under the structure of the
Residual Mechanism, the staff of the Registry and the Prosecutor’s Office
will be significantly reduced, limiting its capacity to hear as many cases.143
With the combination of the ICTR’s impending staff reduction and pressure
to complete its work, political undertones motivated the ICTR to transfer

137. See generally Press Releases, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA, http://
www.unictr.org/tabid/64/default.aspx (last visited Feb. 20, 2012).
138. ICTR Cartoon Book, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA, http://www
.unictr.org/Portals/0/English/News/Cartoon%20Book/ICTR%20Cartoon%20Book%202011.pdf 5343 (last visited Feb. 20, 2012).
139. S.C. Res. 1966, ¶ 3 U.N. Doc. S/RES/1966 (Dec. 22, 2010).
140. S.C. Res. 1503, ¶ 7 U.N. Doc. S/RES/1503 (Aug, 28, 2003); S.C. Res. 1534, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1534 (Mar. 26, 2004).
141. S.C. Res. 1966, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1966 (Dec. 22, 2010).
142. Id. ¶ 1.
143. S.C. Res. 1966, Annex 1, art. 14-15, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1966 (Dec. 22, 2010).
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Uwinkindi’s case to Rwanda. Likely, the transfer is part of a trend to ease
the ICTR’s own caseload.
Since the ICTR’s 2008 11bis motion decisions, Rwanda did not make
any additional significant changes to its laws in order to further clarify that a
penalty of life imprisonment with solitary confinement would not be
imposed on defendants in transfer cases. Yet, in the case of Uwinkindi, the
ICTR did not express concern over the imposition of life imprisonment with
solitary confinement, while the ICTR had been preoccupied with this issue
in four cases from 2008. The opinion in the Uwinkindi case cited no new
developments in law or circumstances with respect to the sentencing issue,
but rather, employed a new set of reasoning to the same set of facts.
Whereas before, the ICTR saw potential for ambiguity in the dual
application of the Death Penalty Abolition Law and the Transfer Law, in the
case of Uwinkindi, the ICTR found that Rwanda’s “Transfer Law on
penalties is consistent with .†.†. this Tribunal, which allows for a maximum
penalty of life imprisonment.”144 Given the fact that the ICTR’s political
climate experienced dramatic developments between 2008 and the granting
of the 11bis motion in the 2011 Uwinkindi case, it is likely that the ICTR’s
change of heart towards Rwanda’s supposedly ambiguous legislation
stemmed more from the ICTR’s own shift in goals towards expediting its
work, than any additional clarifications on the part of Rwanda.
The ICTR, as an entity of the United Nations and not Rwanda, does not
have a duty to consult with the Rwanda judiciary in executing its duties.
There appears to have been little discussion between the ICTR and Rwanda
in addressing Rwanda’s laws on the penalty of life imprisonment. The net
effect of this lack of discussion is a sentiment that the ICTR acts
independently of Rwanda and Rwandans—a negative consequence that the
ICTR should seek to avoid. While the communication between the ICTR
and National Judiciary of Rwanda regarding the supposed ambiguity of
Rwanda’s laws reflects elements of a disharmonious relationship, there are
other areas of the relationship between the ICTR and Rwanda that have
proven to be cooperative, especially over the past several years.
B. Rwanda’s Witness Protection Program, and Other Areas of
Collaboration Between the ICTR and Rwanda
In recent years, the ICTR has begun allowing Rwanda to be more
involved in the process of its international justice. Despite the past conflicts
that have arisen between the ICTR and the National Judiciary of Rwanda,
144. Uwinkindi, Case No. ICTR-2001-75-I, Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for Referral to
the Republic of Rwanda, ¶ 49.
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relations have improved as the ICTR and Rwanda have increased their
collaborative efforts. The ICTR has set up thirteen satellite centers
throughout the country,145 created an internship program for Rwandan
students,146 and has supported Rwanda in establishing and strengthening of
its Witness Protection Unit (WPU).147 While the ICTR’s rationale
concerning the sentencing issue discussed previously is symptomatic of the
ICTR’s lack of trust of the National Judiciary of Rwanda and desire to serve
the ICTR’s own interests of fostering international justice, the collaborative
efforts between the ICTR and Rwanda reflects potential for developing a
more trusting relationship that serves both the interests of the ICTR and
Rwanda.
Specifically, assistance with the WPU in Rwanda made the ICTR feel
more confident that the National Judiciary of Rwanda would be able to
provide for the protection of witnesses testifying in-country.148 Based in
largely on Rwanda’s development of the WPU, the ICTR granted the 11bis
motion in the case of Uwinkindi, believing that international justice would
still be carried out effectively with the transfer of his case to Rwanda. The
National Judiciary of Rwanda, in turn, was satisfied in having the ability to
prosecute his case in-country.
The ICTR also commended Rwanda for making changes in its
legislation that would make it easier for witnesses to testify in transfer cases
without worrying about the consequences of their testimony. When the
ICTR handled the 2008 11bis motions, the ICTR held that Rwanda’s
Genocide Ideology Law could make defense witnesses afraid to testify. As a
result, the ICTR held that the defense may not be able to call a sufficient
number of witnesses due to fear of testifying.149 This is especially true in
light of Rwanda’s law against genocide ideology, under which any person

145. Dieng, supra note 51, at 408.
146. Id. at 410.
147. Id. at 411–12.
148. Although the ICTR advocates for protection of witnesses, the ICTR itself has been
accused of subpar treatment of witnesses in its own proceedings. For example, while European
witnesses testifying at trials were placed in hotels, Rwandan witnesses were instead placed in dorm
rooms. Such treatment on the part of the ICTR towards Rwandans has contributed to the feeling of
disapproval on the part of some members of the Rwandan community towards the ICTR. Survivors
and Post Genocide Justice in Rwanda: Their Experiences, Perspectives, and Hopes, AFRICAN
RIGHTS AND REDRESS (Nov. 2008), http://www.redress.org/downloads/publications/Rwanda%20
Survivors%2031%20Oct%2008.pdf, at 55–59.
149. Kanyarukiga, Case No. ICTR-2002-78, Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for Referral to
the Republic of Rwanda, ¶¶ 26, 27.
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making statements either supporting or denying the Rwanda genocide may
be subject to punishment.150
The ICTR held that “regardless of whether [witnesses’] fears are wellfounded,” the fact that witnesses may be unwilling to testify for the defense
in a transfer case raised serious doubts as to whether a fair trial could be
executed. However, Rwanda addressed this problem by amending its
Transfer Law in 2009 to include immunity for “anything said or done in the
course of a trial.”151 As a result, defense witnesses would not have to be
afraid of testifying in a manner that would violate Rwanda’s Genocide
Ideology Law. This change was a factor in the ICTR’s decision to grant the
11bis motion in Uwinkindi and is an example of how communication
between the ICTR and Rwanda lead to improved legislation and policies
within Rwanda.
However, there are also areas in which the ICTR’s lack of clear
communication with Rwanda has been frustrating. This is particularly true
with respect to the issue of video-link technology, which could be used in a
transfer case to help witnesses outside Rwanda provide testimony. Some
defense witnesses residing outside Rwanda, and holding refugee status
would be unable to testify in-country because travelling to Rwanda could
cause them to lose their refugee status.152 One possible solution that the
ICTR considered in 2008 while evaluating 11bis motions was video-link
testimony. Although the ICTR held that video-link testimony would likely
be authorized for cases in which witnesses residing outside Rwanda could
not testify in person, it nonetheless held that it was “not a completely
satisfactory solution.”153 The ICTR held that direct witness testimony is
preferable to that of video link.154 Thus, in 2008, the ICTR held that it
would disadvantage the defense if its witnesses were to testify by video-link
while most of the witnesses for the prosecution were to testify in person.155
However, when the ICTR evaluated the 11bis motion for the case of
Uwinkindi in 2011, it had a different attitude towards video-link testimony

150. See Shannon E. Powers, Rwanda’s Gacaca Courts: Implications for International
Criminal Law and Transitional Justice, AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (June 23,
2011), http://www.asil.org/insights110623.cfm#_ednref23 (citing Law Relating to the Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide Ideology, Organic Law No. 18/2008 art. 2–3 (Rwanda) (2008)).
151. Uwinkindi, Case No. ICTR-2001-75-I, Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for Referral to
the Republic of Rwanda, ¶ 61.
152. Munyakazi, Case No. ICTR-97-36, Decision on Appeal Against Decision on Referral
Under Rule 11bis, ¶ 46.
153. Id. ¶ 42. The Appeals Chamber agreed with the Trial Chamber that video link would not
be a completely satisfactory solution. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
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than it did in 2008. Whereas before, the ICTR held that the use of video-link
testimony would be a disadvantage when compared to in-person testimony,
the ICTR held in Uwinkindi that the availability of video-link facilities
would provide sufficient availability of witnesses for the defense.156 Thus,
the ICTR held that video-link facilities could in fact be used to allow
witnesses unable to travel to Rwanda to testify, without disadvantaging the
defense.157 The ICTR’s change in disposition towards the use of video link
technology and subsequent granting of the 11bis motion may be due, in part,
to the Security Council’s mounting pressure on the ICTR to complete work
in Rwanda. Thus, even in the area of witness testimony, there is still
potential to improve communication and collaboration between the ICTR
and Rwanda.
C. Using Mediation to Improve the Relationship Between the ICTR and
Rwanda
In order for the ICTR and Rwanda to better communicate and
collaborate with respect to conflicts that may arise with the transfer of the
Uwinkindi case to Rwanda’s national jurisdiction, the use of a neutral third
party mediator should be considered. Although the ICTR called for the
African Commission on Human and People’s Rights (ACHPR) to facilitate
the transfer of the Uwinkindi case to the National Judiciary of Rwanda,
ICTR indicated that the role of the ACHPR would be to monitor the
proceedings of the National Judiciary of Rwanda.158 However, it would
behoove the ICTR to reconsider the role that the ACHPR should play. As a
monitoring mechanism, the ACHPR might be one-sided in communicating
to the ICTR the status of the national judiciary’s proceedings, without fully
informing the National Judiciary of Rwanda of concerns that the ICTR may
develop. This problem was encountered in February 2012, when the ICTR
indicated that the transfer of the Uwinkindi case to Rwanda’s jurisdiction
would be delayed pending an unlikely appeal being made by Uwinkindi’s
defense (which was ultimately dismissed), and also due to a delay in the

156. Uwinkindi, Case No. ICTR-2001-75-I, Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for Referral to
the Republic of Rwanda, ¶ 113.
157. Id. Under the amendments made to Rwanda’s Transfer Law in 2009, testimony could
also be provided by witnesses outside Rwanda through depositions or by testifying before a judge
sitting in a foreign jurisdiction. Id. ¶ 112.
158. Id. ¶ 35.
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institution of the ACHPR in Rwanda.159 In the transfer case of Uwinkindi,
and those that will likely follow, a mediation forum would enable the
National Judiciary of Rwanda to make its concerns heard, and afford the
ICTR the opportunity to respond accordingly.
Another issue that may require mediation in the case of Uwinkindi and
subsequent transfer cases is in reconciling the family and friends of victims
with the alleged perpetrators.160 One of the benefits of gacaca was that the
family and friends of victims had the opportunity to confront the alleged
murderers, and thereby relinquish some of their anger by hearing
confessions firsthand. While the gacaca judges acted as mediators between
the suspects and the public, the ICTR and national judiciary may wish to
consider incorporating the mediation aspect of gacaca into the proceedings.
Additionally, if Uwinkindi or another transferee was acquitted, or
eventually released from prison, the dilemma would exist as to where that
person would relocate. Currently, the ICTR provides safe-houses for
persons who have been acquitted by the ICTR, but are unable to reintegrate
into Rwanda society, likely because of fear of persecution by family and
friends of genocide victims.161 In order to address the issue of post-trial
acquittals, the ICTR may want to encourage the use of mediators like Pastor
Guhegi in As We Forgive in order to help exonerated suspects reintegrate
into life in Rwanda without fear of being persecuted by the public at large.
Mediation would also foster healing on part of the family and friends of the
victims, as Rosaria was able to release resentment towards the man who
murdered her sister and her sister’s children. While the transfer of the
Uwinkindi case to the national jurisdiction of Rwanda is of momentous
significance, it could make an even greater impact with the integrated use of
mediation.
V. CONCLUSION
One of the important aspects of a public trial is the effect that it has on
the community at large. Public trials often offer a means by which apology

159. Edmund Kagire, Rwanda Dismayed by Further Delay of Uwinkindi’s Transfer, THE NEW
TIMES (Feb. 25, 2012) http://in2eastafrica.net/rwanda-dismayed-by-further-delay-of-uwinkindistransfer/; Uwinkindi, Case No. ICTR-2001-75-I, Decision on Uwinkindi’s Motion for Review or
Reconsideration of the Decision on Referral to Rwanda and the Related Prosecution Motion
(Appeals Chamber, Feb. 23, 2012).
160. See Address by Judge Khalida Rachid Khan, President of the ICTR, to the United Nations
Security Council - Six Monthly Report on the Completion Strategy of the ICTR Dec 7, 2011,
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA, http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/tabid/155
/default%20.aspx?id=1244.
161. See id.
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can be offered to the community. It is through the discourse between the
offended and the offender that healing can begin to take place. An apology is
the experience and expression of remorse for the violation of a rule.162 As
legal scholar Lee Taft explains, “The expression of contrition provides a
legitimate moral reason for the offended party to grant forgiveness.”163 As a
result, apology allows forgiveness to take place, which is the “overcoming of
resentment.”164 The overcoming of resentment, in turn, leads to healing.165
The transfer of Uwinkindi’s case will aid the process of forgiveness and
healing on part of the Rwandan people by embodying elements of gacaca.
In gacaca, there is not only an “active, sometimes acknowledgement of
crimes committed,” but also a process of mediation in which family and
friends of victims are able to begin letting go of past offenses committed
against their loved ones, knowing that justice is being served.166 Allowing
Rwandans to bear witness as their own country prosecutes Uwinkindi can
help in the process of forgiveness across the country, more than if the case
were tried in Tanzania. With the presence of the ACHPR or another neutral
entity to serve as a mediator between the National Judiciary of Rwanda and
the ICTR it will be possible to strive towards national reconciliation as well
as international justice.167 Despite the tension that has characterized the
relationship between the ICTR and the National Judiciary of Rwanda in the
past, its future has the potential for harmony and cooperation.

162. Taft, supra note 120, at 1139–40.
163. Id. at 1144.
164. Id. at 1143.
165. Id. at 1145.
166. CLARK, supra note 4, at 43.
167. See infra, Appendix 1.
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